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LEGISLATIVE NOTES
MICHIGAN STANDARDS OF CONDUCT
AND ETHICS ACT OF 1973
The vitality of our democratic form of government in which the
people select representatives to enact and administer the laws that
govern our affairs depends upon steadfast public confidence in the
integrity of those representatives. 1 Whenever the public perceives
a conflict between the private interests and public duties of a gov-2
ernmental officer or employee, that confidence is threatened.
Michigan lawmakers, in an attempt to insure the integrity of state3
government personnel and thereby increase public confidence,
have recently enacted the Standards of Conduct and Ethics Act of
1973.4

Michigan's
signed to help
public office
government. 5

new law incorporates two complementary steps degovernmental personnel avoid conflicts of interest in
and promote faith in the integrity of state
First, acknowledging that the complexities of mod-

I See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 12-3001 et seq. (Supp. 1973).
2 See ALA. CODE tit. 55, § 327(8) (Cum. Supp. 1973).
1 See Mich. Exec. Order No. 1973-4, Declaration of Policy (January 25, 1973). This order
laid the groundwork for the Standards of Conduct and Ethics Act of 1973, MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 15.341 et seq. (Supp. 1973). See note 4 infra.
4 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 15.341 et seq. (Supp. 1973). The process which led to the
enactment of this statute was set in motion by the Governor, who, on January 25, 1973,
proclaimed a Code of Ethics for public officials and employees. Mich. Exec. Order No.
1973-4 (January 24, 1973). The state Attorney General, after reviewing the Executive Order,
indicated that it presented constitutional problems which would have to be resolved. Mich.
Att'y. Gen. Letter Opinion (July 31, 1973). The Attorney General cited three problems with
the Executive Order. The first concern was that the Executive Order encroached upon the
power of the legislature delineated in MICH. CONST. art. 4, § 10. The second concern was
that the Governor appeared to have established an administrative body, the State Board of
Ethics, and vested it with certain powers and duties without benefit of authorizing legislation
and without any appropriation. The final concern was whether the Executive Order encroached upon the power of the Civil Service Commission insofar as the Order purported to
cover the conduct of the civil service employees. As a result, legislation establishing the
State Board of Ethics as a permanent statutory body was introduced. MICH. S. JOUR. No.
II1, 1856 (November 13, 1973). With only minor amendments, this bill was given overwhelming support by the Senate. MICH. S. JouR. No. 121, 2029 (December 6, 1973). One
week later the House concurred. MICH. H. R. JouR. 124, 3081, 3085 (December 13, 1973).
On January 8, 1974, not quite one year after his Executive Order proclaiming a Code of
Ethics for public officers and employees, the Governor signed and gave immediate effect to
the Standards of Conduct and Ethics Act of 1973.
' See part ii infra.
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ern society and the diverse interests of our highly complex
economic system necessitate the establishment of guidelines for
public officials, 6 standards of conduct for public officers and employees are prescribed in the statute. 7 Secondly, recognizing the
need for a disciplinary mechanism to ensure the uniform maintenance of those standards, a state board of ethics has been created
and its powers and duties prescribed. 9
This article undertakes an analysis of the Standards of Conduct
and Ethics Act. After a discussion of the factors prompting enactment, the statutory framework of the Act is presented. Finally, the
Michigan legislation is contrasted with and evaluated in light of
similar statutory efforts in other states.
I. PROBLEMS ANTEDATING THE ENACTMENT OF
PUBLIC ACT 196 OF 1973

Prior to the enactment of the Standards of Conduct and Ethics
Act of 1973, the methods used to insure the integrity of those
having duties and responsibilities in the state government of
Michigan were largely ineffective. 10 Previous Michigan provisions
were limited in scope. The two major statutes in the area 1 1 were
aimed at eliminating conflicts of interest on the part of legislators,
state officers, and other public servants but only with respect to
contracts with public entities.1 2 By Executive Order, 13 Michigan's
Governor had established standards of conduct for state employees, but the provisions of this Order were also limited in both
scope and applicability. This Order, which applied only to state
employees, addressed the conflict of interest issue in the specific
areas of disclosure of confidential information, gifts and favors,
representation of private interests, supplementary employment,

See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 12-3001 et seq. (Supp. 1973).
1 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 15.342 (Supp. 1973).
8 See N. J.STAT. ANN. § 52:13D-12(b) (Supp. 1974-75).
9 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 15.343-346 (Supp. 1973).
10 See notes 11-17 and accompanying text infra.
6

"MICH.

COMP. LAWS ANN. § 15.301 et seq. (Supp. 1973); MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. §

15.321 et seq. (Supp. 1973).
12 See MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 15.301 et seq. (Supp. 1973). (The statute implements
the provisions of section 10 of article 4 of the Michigan constitution, relating to substantial
conflicts of interest on the part of members of the legislature and state officers with respect
to contracts with the state and the political subdivisions thereof and provides for penalties
for the violations thereof.). MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 15.321 et seq. (Supp. 1973). (This

provision relates to the conduct of public servants in respect to contracts with public entities
and provides penalties for the violation of its terms.).
13 Mich. Exec. Order No. 1966-3 (May 13, 1966).
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and investments in conflict with public responsibilities. The
Michigan Civil Service Commission had also formulated standards
of conduct 1 4 but these were, by and large, repetitive of the stan15
dards established by the Governor's order.
Before the 1973 Act, there was no single, central body which
could receive complaints concerning alleged unethical conduct. In

attempts to file and receive action upon their complaints, citizens
petitioned any of a number of entities. 16 The resulting confusion
seriously impaired the effectiveness of provisions which were al7
ready of limited utility. 1
I.

THE STANDARDS OF CONDUCT AND ETHICS ACT

OF 1973

A. Standards
The title of this Act reflects one of its central objectives: to
provide standards of conduct for public officers and employees. 18
These standards are designed to: (a) apprise those who are subject
to the Act of the behavior which is expected of them in the course
of their public duties; and (b) provide the public with a gauge by
which it can measure the behavior of its state employees and
officials.' 9 To this end, the Act specifically prohibits seven types of
improper activity: 20 violating government confidences; 2 1 engaging
in transactions in which one may benefit from his or her official
position or confidences obtained as a result of that position;22 using
14 MICH. DEPT. OF CIVIL SERVICE, STATE EMPLOYEE RELATIONS POLICY (April 26,
1966); MICHIGAN CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION RULES § 7 (Nov. 1973). (This particular
provision addresses the issue of political activities of state employees).
15 See id.
16 Prior to the enactment of the Standards of Conduct and Ethics Act of 1973 various

parties, e.g., the Governor, the Attorney General, the Auditor General, the Director of the
State Civil Service Commission, and the heads of various state agencies were contacted by
citizens who sought to initiate action against state personnel for behavior alleged to be in
violation of their public trust. Interview with Donald J. Willis, Executive Director of the
State of Michigan Board of Ethics, in Lansing, Michigan, Sept. 27, 1974.
17 Id.
18 The Standards of Conduct and Ethics Act, MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 15.341 et seq.
(Supp. 1973).
19 See Mich. Exec. Order No. 1973-4 (January 25, 1973). This order, which laid the
groundwork for the Standards of Conduct and Ethics Act, declares,
The purpose of these standards is to provide each state employee and appointed official with a clear understanding of the behavior expected of them in
the performance of their public responsibilities and to give the citizens of
Michigan a standard by which they may be assured that these responsibilities
are being faithfully performed.
20 MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 15.342 (Supp. 1973).

21 Id. § 15.342(1).
22 Id. § 15.342(5).
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resources under one's official control for personal benefit;2 3 accepting gifts or favors tending to influence performance of official
duties; 2 4 engaging oneself in employment which may tend to impair
one's objectivity in the performance of one's official duties;2 5 participating in official actions relating to any business entity in which
one has even an indirect interest; 26 and representing one's personal
opinion as that of the government agency in which he or she
works. 27
B. Implementation

The state board of ethics created by the Act2 8 is designed to
oversee the implementation of the standards of conduct established
by the new legislation. As suggested above,2 9 the board filled a
void for citizens seeking a central entity to which they could submit
complaints concerning the improper behavior of state officials or
employees.
Under the Act, the board is charged with three major responsibilities. First, it investigates all citizen complaints alleging unethical conduct by any person subject to the Act, and, if necessary,
makes recommendations to the party with supervisory responsibility for the person who was the subject of the investigation. 30 Secondly, the board can, on its own initiative, undertake investigations of'practices which could affect the ethical conduct of a public
officer or employee. 3 1 Finally, the board can issue and publish
advisory opinions relating to matters affecting the ethical conduct
of particular state officials or employees who are subject to the
Act.3 2 However, such opinions are issued only when requested by
appointed such an
a public officer or employee or by one who
33
individual or who is his or her supervisor.
34
The board is empowered to promulgate its own procedures.

23
24
25

Id. § 15.342(3).
Id. § 15.342(4).

Id. § 15.342(6).
Id. § 15.342(7).
Id. § 15.342(2).
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 15.343, -.345 (Supp. 1973).
See notes 16-17 and accompanying text supra.
30 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 15.345(1)(a) (Supp. 1973).
3- Id. § 15.345(l)(b). The Board of Ethics could initiate an investigation pursuant to the
power granted it in this subsection, if, for example, it were aware of the giving of Christmas
gifts by a certain entity to an agency responsible for regulating that entity. See MICH.
Comp. LAWS ANN. § 15.342(4) (Supp. 1973).
32 Id. § 15.345(1)(e).
33 Id.
3' MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 15.346 (Supp. 1973).
26
27
28
29
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However, the Act requires that certain procedures must be included in the board's rules. For example, the board's rules must
provide that the board can request the attendance of witnesses
who it decides will aid in the conduct of a particular investigation.35 Furthermore, the rules must empower the board to
compel any witness appearing before it to submit sworn testimony,
at the board's option. 36 Finally, the rules must provide for open
meetings except in those situations in which the board deems it
necessary to meet in private for the protection of individual
rights .37
All departments of state government are obliged to cooperate
with the board in the conduct of its investigations. 38 In addition, all
authorities to whom the board makes post-investigatory recommendations are required to take
appropriate action in accordance
39
with such recommendations.
III.

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF LEGISLATIVE EFFORTS
IN OTHER STATES

The Standards of Conduct and Ethics Act of 1973 is designed to
increase public confidence in the integrity of government. The provisions of the Act are clearly oriented toward that goal. In order to
assess its potential for achieving its purpose, it is instructive to
compare it with ethics legislation in other states.
A. Standards
1. Applicability - Executive branch appointees and employees
are the only persons subject to the standards of conduct imposed
by the Michigan statute. 40 Several other states have enacted ethics
legislation applicable to a broader range of government personnel.
For example, the standards of a number of these laws are applied
to elected as well as appointed officers.41 Some statutes prescribe
35 Id. § 15.346(a).
36 Id. § 15.346(b).
37 Id. § 15.346(d).
38 MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 15.345(I)(a) (Supp. 1973).
39 Id. §§ 15.345(3) and (4).
40 The heading of the Standards of Conduct and Ethics Act of 1973, MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 15.341 et seq. (Supp. 1973), provides that the Act is to prescribe standards of
conduct for public officers and employees. MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 15.341(c) (Supp.
1973) states, " 'Public officer' means a person appointed by the governor or another executive department official." Id. § 15.341(b) reads, " 'Employee' means an employee, classified
or unclassified, of the executive branch of the state."
" See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 112.311 et seq. (Supp. 1973-74).
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standards of conduct applicable to members of the legislative4 2 and
judicial 4 3 branches of government. Finally, some states address the
issue by applying their code of ethics not only on the state level but
also to officials of political subdivisions of the state.4 4
Several issues must be addressed when considering the wisdom
of applying standards of conduct to a broader group. For instance,
the propriety of broadening coverage so as to encompass a particular group must be considered. In Michigan, there appears to be no
real need to subject the judicial branch of government to the provisions of this Act as it is under the jurisdiction of the Judicial Tenure
Commission which has the power to recommend reprimand, suspension, or removal of a judge. Moreover, the constitutional
propriety of applying this statute to the judiciary is quite dubious.
Another issue which must be considered is the suitability of the
state administrative machinery for the competent application of
these standards to a broader range of persons. The standards of the
Michigan Act appear to be drawn in a manner which would enable
the board to apply them to elected state officials and members of
the legislative branch of government. It is not clear that the board,
with its present resources, could handle the increased caseload
which could reasonably be expected to follow an expansion of its
jurisdiction, but if such a problem were to arise, it seems likely that
the appropriate administrative adjustments could be made. The
cost of such adjustments would be well worth the added effectiveness which could be achieved by applying uniform standards to as
many persons as possible throughout the state who, in the eyes of
the public, are associated with the government.
Moreover, while it is too early to reach firm conclusions about
the performance of the Michigan Board of Ethics, experience to
date indicates the need for broader jurisdiction. Of four "Ethical
Decisions" which the Board has handed down, two have been
dismissals of complaints for failure to fall within the Board's
jurisdiction. 45 To the extent that citizens such as the complainants

42 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:13D-12 et seq. (Supp. 1974-75).
43 See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-347 et seq. (1973).
44 See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 67-16-1 et seq. (Supp. 1973).

4' See State of Michigan Board of Ethics, No. 74-ED3, No. 74-ED4. The SmeekensHillsdale Foundry Affair is a classic example of a legislative "conflict-of-interest" which
turned into a scandal of state-wide proportions. See Detroit Free Press, June 6, 1974, at
I-A, col. 8; id. July 5, 1974, at 3-A, col. 3; id. July 10, 1974, at 3-A, col. 2, at 6-A, col. 1; id.
July 11, 1974, at 3-A, col. 2, at 10-A, col. 1; id. July 12, 1974, at 5-A, col. 1; id. July 13, 1974,
at 3-A, col. 2; id. July 14, 1974, at 3-A, col. 4; id. July 18, 1974, at I-A, col. 5; id. July 21,
1974, at 2-D, col. 1; id. July 23, 1974, at 4-B, col. 1, at 3-C, col. 5; id. July 24, 1974, at 2-A,
col. 1; id. August 4, 1974, at 3-A, col. 1; id. August 8, 1974, at 13-A, col. I; id. September 23,
1974, at 6-A, col. 1.
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in these cases are frustrated in their attempts to hold government
personnel accountable for their acts, the goal of increased public
confidence in the integrity of government is thwarted.
2. Scope - Another requisite for success of a statutory scheme
enacted to bolster public confidence is an ability to deal with all
appearances of impropriety in government. The Michigan Act
proscribes seven manifestations of impropriety. 4 6 Unlike several
comparable statutes, it does not, however, contain a general catchall proscription. 47 For instance, the Massachusetts statute provides:
No officer or employee ... shall pursue a course of conduct
which will raise suspicion among the public that he is
likely to
48
be engaged in acts that are in violation of his trust.
The value of providing such a catchall phrase in legislation of this
nature cannot be understated. To begin with, a statute which
merely catalogues proscribed conduct does not have the flexibility
needed to cope with the immense varieties of conduct that society
deems to be unethical. The limited utility of exclusive cataloguing
has been demonstrated repeatedly. 49 Furthermore, public
confidence in government is susceptible to being undermined not
only when unethical behavior is manifested but also when suspicion arises that an officer or employee of the government is likely
to be engaged in activities which violate his or her public trust.
Standing alone, the proscriptions of the Michigan statute are not
sufficient to achieve the goal of avoiding all appearances of impropriety. A catchall provision prohibiting any conduct which could
raise public suspicion is much more likely than an exclusive
catalogue to ensure confidence in the government.
3. Specific standards--Disclosure. Public disclosure of economic interests can be a most effective way to strengthen public confidence in the integrity of government. It is not necessarily
improper for government personnel to have private interests related to their public positions; however, it is important that such
interests be revealed in order that the public can judge for itself the
integrity of its government officials and employees.
An overwhelming number of states have written disclosure provisions into their ethics legislation. 5 0 The Michigan statute does
46 See text accompanying notes 21-27 supra.

See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 268A, § 23(o (1968).
Id.
" See, e.g., Perkins, The New Federal Conflict-of-Interest Law, 76 HARV. L. REV. I 113
(1963).
50 See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 12-3001 et seq. (Supp. 1973).
17

48
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not contain a disclosure provision. While a disclosure requirement
would, to a certain degree, impinge on individual privacy, such an
infringement would be a reasonable price to exact from those who
choose to serve in government. Requiring disclosure would help to
eliminate suspicions of impropriety and approach the goal of increased public confidence in government.
Confidentialinformation. As noted earlier, 5 1 one of the purposes
underlying the Michigan Act is to provide notice as to the behavior
which is expected of government officials and employees. Yet the
Act fails, in at least one respect, to achieve that purpose. It provides that a public officer or employee shall not divulge, or engage
in a business transaction in which he or she may benefit from,
"confidential information" acquired or obtainable in the course of
employment. 52 But, in view of the fact that the state government
has no established procedure for determining the confidentiality of
information, those subject to the Act have no sure way of ascertaining the behavior that is expected of them in this respect. The
Michigan statute would be strengthened if it incorporated the approach which other jurisdictions have used to solve this problem. 53
For example, the Ohio statute provides,
...no public official or employee shall disclose or use for his
personal profit, without appropriate authorization, any information acquired by him in the course of his official duties
which has been clearly designated to him as confidential
54

Unauthorized use of resources: The Michigan statute prohibits

the use of personnel, resources, property, and funds under one's
official control "for personal gain or benefit." ' 55 It is possible that a
situation would arise in which the board, desiring to take action
against a state officer or employee for the unauthorized use of such
resources, would be unable to proceed because of the restrictive
wording, "for personal gain or benefit." 56 In order to avoid this
possibility, it would be useful to substitute for the objectionable
phrase such wording as that in parallel sections of comparable state
provisions. Instructive in this regard is the Alabama statute, which
provides,

51 See note 19 and accompanying text supra.
52 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 15.342(1), (5) (Supp. 1973).
'3 See, e.g., Orno REV. CODE ANN. § 102.03(B) (Page Supp.
54 Id. (emphasis added).

51 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 15.342(3) (Supp. 1973).
56 Id.

1973).
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No state official or employee shall use an official position or
office to obtain financial gain for himself, or his family, or any
business with which he or a member of his family is associated
57
unless such use and gain are specifically authorized by law.
Language of another portion of the Michigan Act itself which
could be beneficially employed in this context reads, "for the
benefit of any person or organization, other than the state." '58
Solicitation or acceptance of things of value. Solicitation or acceptance of a thing of value "which tends to influence" the manner
in which one performs his official duties is explicitly proscribed by
the Standards of Conduct and Ethics Act of 1973. 59 Several comparable statutes employ a more objective standard in this respect. 6 °
For instance, the Florida statute provides,
No officer or employee . . .shall accept any gift, favor, or
service, of value to the recipient, that would cause a reasonably prudent
person to be influenced in the discharge of official
61
duties.
Such a standard is superior to the subjective standard of the
Michigan standard in two respects. First, it is much easier to
apply. For example, a gift which tends to influence an individual of
weak moral fibre might not tend to influence a stronger person.
Under the Michigan statute the moral fibre of individuals would
have to be determined before it could be decided whether they
violated the standard. The difficulties involved in attempting to
make such determinations are readily apparent. On the other hand,
if the more objective standard is applied, it is necessary to ask only
whether such a gift would tend to influence a reasonable person.
Morever, since the more objective standard forbids behavior
which appears improper (in that it would influence a reasonable
man), it is more effective in maintaining public confidence.
B. Implementation
1. Attenaance of witnesses-The Michigan Act declares that the
temporary and permanent rules of the board of ethics shall provide
that the board may "request" the attendance of witnesses. 6 2 In

57ALA. CODE tit. 55, § 327(10) (Cum. Supp. 1973).
"' MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 15.342(4) (Supp. 1973).
59 Id.
60 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 112.313(1) (Supp. 1973-74).
61 Id.

62 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §15.346(a) (Supp. 1973).
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contrast, many comparable statutes authorize state boards63 of
ethics to compel the attendance of witnesses by subpoena.

It

seems likely that if a board can only request the attendance of
witnesses, an uncooperative party could seriously impair its ability

to conduct an effective investigation. Although the experience of
the Michigan board has been that witnesses have respected its

requests, 64 the potential for an uncooperative witness limiting the
effectiveness of the board and, to that extent, thwarting the goals
of the statute could be greatly minimized if the board were au-

thorized to compel the attendance of witnesses and the production
of documents it deems relevant to its investigations.
2. Action pursuantto board recommendations - As pointed out
above, 65 the board of ethics is empowered to make recommenda-

tions to the appointing authority with supervisory responsibility for
any person whose activities have been investigated. Although the

statute declares that an appointing authority shall take appropriate
66
action upon receipt of such a recommendation from the board,

there is no mechanism for enforcing the board's recommendations.
Thus, an authority who chose to ignore the board's recommendations could nullify the efforts of the board and frustrate the purposes underlying the Act.
Comparable state statutes suggest alternatives which would help

avoid such an undesirable situation. For instance, some statutes
provide sanctions against authorities who fail to comply with the

instructions of ethics boards. 67 Other statutes provide that certain
parties other than the appointing authority can take action on the
board's recommendations. Chief among such parties are the

11 See,

e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 49-1111(3) (1974) which provides,
In connection with any hearing, the board or committee shall have the power
by subpoena to compel the appearance of witnesses and the production of any
relevant evidence. Any witness compelled to attend or to produce evidence
shall be entitled to the fees and expenses allowed in district court. Any failure
to respond to any such subpoena shall be certified by the chairman to the
district court for Lancaster County for enforcement or for punishment as for
contempt of the district court.
64 Interview with Donald J. Willis, Executive Director of the State of Michigan Board of
Ethics, in Lansing, Michigan, Sept. 27, 1974.
65 See text accompanying note 30 supra.
66 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 15.345(3), (4) (Supp. 1973).
67 See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 55, § 327(23)(d) (Cum. Supp. 1973) which declares,
Failure on the part of any agency head who is not an elected official to comply
promptly with any lawful directive, order or instruction received from the
commission shall subject him to all penalties provided for elsewhere in this
chapter and shall cause the immediate suspension of all salary and other
benefits which he otherwise would be entitled to receive. Such suspension
shall remain in effect during the period in which he fails or refuses to
comply ....
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governor, 68 the attorney general, 6 9 and the district attorney.7 0 The

effectiveness of the Michigan statute would7 be greatly enhanced if
it incorporated these or other alternatives. 1
3. Amendment of complaints by the board - It is conceivable
that, in the conduct of an investigation, a board could discover
violations other than those cited in the complaint under consideration. In such a situation, the board would need the power to take
action with regard to those violations. As the statute stands, however, the Michigan board is not clearly empowered to amend a
complaint and make recommendations based on newly discovered
violations. In contrast, the Connecticut ethics statute provides,
If the committee, during the course of its investigation, has
probable cause to believe that violations of this chapter, other
than those contained in the complaint, have been committed, it
may upon its own motion amend the complaint to include such
violations. If the complaint is so amended by the committee, a
copy of the amendment shall be sent to the person complained
against within forty-eight hours. Any action by the committee
on such 72amendment shall be made part of the committee's
findings.

The board's ability to effectively administer the standards of conduct established by the Act would be greatly enhanced if it possessed the flexible power assigned to the Connecticut board. With
such a power at its disposal, the board would be better equipped to
deal with all manifestations of impropriety regardless of when or
how they come to light.
4. Filing of a periodic report - The advisability of a periodical
evaluation of the operations of an ethics board should not be
underestimated. A comprehensive review of the experiences of a
board would enhance the discovery of problems which limit its

§ 84-32(b) (Supp. 1973).
6 See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 55, § 327(34)(b) (Cum. Supp. 1973).
70 Id.
71 One attractive alternative would involve the board sending its recommendations not
only to the appointing authority but also to the attorney general. If the appointing authority
failed to take action on the recommendations within a reasonable period of time, the attorney general would then be empowered to take action not only against the party who is the
subject of the board's recommendations but also against the defaulting authority. Such a
procedure would go a long way towards improving the follow up stage which is vital to the
success of this effort to promote public confidence in the integrity of government.
72 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-72 (Supp. 1974-75).
68 See, e.g., HAWAII REV. STAT.
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effectiveness and encourage remedial legislation. The Michigan
Act, unlike comparable statutes, 73 does not provide a mechanism
for such review. The filing of a periodic summary of operations
with the legislature and governor could lead to adaptations which
would enable the board to overcome obstacles to the fulfillment of

its mission.

IV.

CONCLUSION

The Standards of Conduct and Ethics Act of 1973, insofar as it
mitigates problems of limited scope and applicability and provides

a board of ethics to ensure uniform adherence to its standards,
represents an improvement in Michigan's approach to the issue of
ethics in government. This improvement can not, however, diminish the fact that the Michigan legislature fell far short of the
optimum legislation when it enacted this statute. The Act suffers
from numerous statutory inadequacies and implementation
deficiencies, the most notable of which is the failure to subject
elected state officials and members of the legislative branch of
government to its standards. The elimination of these defects can
move Michigan closer to the goal of increased public confidence in

the integrity of government.
-Roger Alan Petzke

7 See, e.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 11.07(5) (Supp. 1974-75) which provides,
No later than September 1 of each year, the board shall report to the legislature and the governor concerning its actions in the preceeding fiscal year,
including a summary of its determinations; the names and duties of all persons
employed by the board; and shall make such further reports on the matters
within its jurisdiction and such recommendations for further legislation as it
deems desirable. The report shall contain the current and complete text of all
guidelines issued by the board.

